Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Jg. 46 (2017-11-01), Heft 4, S. 1163-1191
Online
academicJournal
Zugriff:
We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game.
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Cartwright, Edward ; Stepanova, Anna |
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Zeitschrift: | International Journal of Game Theory, Jg. 46 (2017-11-01), Heft 4, S. 1163-1191 |
Veröffentlichung: | 2017 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0020-7276 (print) |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1 |
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