Outside Directors and CEO Selection.
In: Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, Jg. 31 (1996-09-01), Heft 3, S. 337-355
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Zugriff:
This paper documents a strong positive relation between the percentage of outside directors and the frequency of outside CEO succession. The likelihood that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO increases monotonically with the percentage of outside directors. This monotonic relation is observed for both voluntary and forced departures. Evidence from stock returns around succession announcements indicates that, on average, shareholders benefit from outside appointments, but are harmed when an insider replaces a fired CEO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Titel: |
Outside Directors and CEO Selection.
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Borokhovich, Kenneth A. ; Parrino, Robert ; Trapani, Teresa |
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Zeitschrift: | Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, Jg. 31 (1996-09-01), Heft 3, S. 337-355 |
Veröffentlichung: | 1996 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0022-1090 (print) |
DOI: | 10.2307/2331395 |
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