"I Told Him That the French Army Being Auxiliary in This Continent, It Was Up to the American General to Give His Orders": The Paradoxes of French Military Operations in America, 1778–1783.

On 19 October 1781, at the surrender of Yorktown, the Comte de Rochambeau replied to the British general Charles O'Hara, who wanted to give his sword to Rochambeau rather than George Washington, that the French army was only auxiliary on this continent. This reply corresponded exactly to the mission defined at Versailles the previous year. But it is surprising: how can a great military power take orders from a smaller one? The answer lies in the evolution of the practical arrangements for Franco-American military cooperation between 1778 and 1781. France sent large naval and land forces across the Atlantic. But for success to be possible, the French and Americans had to be able to act together, and French sailors and soldiers had to be able to master combined operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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