Hur bör vi reglera självständiga centralbanker? Riksbanken och den penningpolitiska verktygslådan. (Swedish)

Within what boundaries are independent central banks allowed to operate? This question is seldom discussed but has gained prominence due to the changes in monetary policy since the 2008/09 financial crisis. Notably, the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, along with other central banks, has expanded its monetary policy toolkit to include so-called quantitative easing--primarily the purchase of securities, mainly bonds. Originally conceived as crisis instruments, these balance sheet measures have increasingly been embraced as monetary policy tools for stabilizing both the economic cycle and inflation. A growing body of literature suggests that these measures carry numerous adverse side-effects on the macroeconomy, and risk extending monetary policy beyond the original constraints set when the Riksbank gained independence in the 1990s. This article problematizes this evolution and raises the question of whether the monetary policy framework needs to be updated to limit the discretionary space of an independent Riksbank. The article concludes with a discussion on what potential reforms to this framework might entail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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